British Re-Nationalization and Regulation: The Government\u27s Liability to Shareholders by Williams, Kris
BRITISH RE-NATIONALIZATION AND
REGULATION: THE GOVERNMENT'S
LIABILITY TO SHAREHOLDERS*
KRIs WILLIAMS"
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher transformed the
political and economic agenda of Great Britain. Emphasizing
the traditional values of economic liberalism, Thatcher limited
the role of the state in the economy and reduced the influence
of trade unions. Privatizing many of its nationalized indus-
tries, the British Government sold off most of its shares in
numerous industries, including British Telecom, Brit Gas,
British Aerospace, and Cable & Wireless. The number of
shareholders in Great Britain soared. Currently, Britain is
second only to the United States as a shareholding democra-
cy.I
Privatization had several effects which were vital to the
success of the Thatcher government. First, privatization
raised over eight billion pounds for the British treasury by
1988.2 This money helped fund many of Thatcher's undertak-
ings, including income tax reductions and the Falklands War.
* This Comment was written prior to the British general election in April
1992 as well as Neil Kinnock's subsequent resignation as Labour party
leader. However, these events had little effect on the Labour party
platform. The party's commitment, for example, to re-nationalization and
regulation remain unchanged. The Labour party had abandoned its
commitment to sweeping re-nationalization prior to the 1992 general
election. By the mid-1980s, the Labour party had adopted its current policy
favoring industrial regulation and limited re-nationalization.
The British populace did not reject the Labour party's commitment to
re-nationalization and regulation when it elected the Conservatives to
another term in April 1992. The Conservative's slim margin of victory can
more accurately be attributed to Neil Kinnock's promise to increase taxes.
Following Kinnock's resignation, the Labour party modified its tax plan.
Yet, the Labour party has not retreated from its commitment to industrial
regulation and limited re-nationalization.
** J.D. 1993, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1990, The College of
William & Mary.
1 K. HARRIS, THATCHER 156 (1988).
2 DENNIS KAVANAGH, THATCHERISM AND BRITISH POLITICS: THE END OF
CONSENSUS? 224 (1987).
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Additionally, over 20% of the British population were share-
holders by 1987. The number of shareholders had an
important impact on the electorate; by 1987, "MORI found
[fifty-seven percent] of privatisation share buyers intending to
vote Conservative .. . "4 Privatization also directly affected
the authority of the trade unions. By decreasing the number
of nationalized industries, Thatcher reduced the authority of
the public trade unions and, therefore, decreased the Labour
Party's political strength. Thatcher thus increased her own
power and insured major economic transformation.
Nevertheless, the 1990s may prove Thatcher's changes to
be ephemeral. The liberal economic market, supported by
privatized industries, may be modified. Because the Labour
remains committed to public ownership and social services, it
could regulate or re-nationalize British industry, substantially
intervening in the free market, if it is able to defeat the
lackluster government of Prime Minister John Major.
Regulation and re-nationalization represent real market
alternatives for a putative Labour government, but the legal
consequences of such structural changes are unclear. British
law does not mandate a specific amount of compensation for
individual shareholders if British industries are regulated or
re-nationalized; therefore, the amount of compensation that
will be given to shareholders is uncertain. British legal
precedent and legislative statutes regarding previous national-
ization provide insight into possibilities for future compensa-
tion. If privatized industries are regulated or re-nationalized,
Britain's political agenda could influence shareholder liability.
Compensation will be costly to the British treasury as well as
to Labour. Depletion of the treasury could devastate the
British economy and subsequently Labour's popularity.5
Because British law does not mandate full compensation, the
LP may use alternative compensation methods.
3 See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 156.
" Class Voting Withers Away, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1987, at 60. MORI,
Market & Opinion Research International, is a prominent and respected
British market research organization.
rSee generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957). Downs argues that the populace inevitably votes according to the
current health of the economy. In that case the Labour party would suffer
politically during an economic downturn caused by treasury depletion.
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2. LABOUR'S PoLITIcAL AGENDA
The LP has traditionally been associated with public
ownership and national social services. From its election in
1979 the Thatcher government recognized the threat Labour
posed to implementing Thatcher's agenda. In July of 1979 the
Tory government announced the first sale of a nationalized
industry, British Aerospace. Although the industry secretary,
Keith Joseph, arranged the sale, many British were concerned
about re-nationalization. During this time an Economist
article illustrated the concern that re-nationalization would
depress market prices: "[t]he market will have to judge these
prospects, plus the political risk of a future Labour
government's re-nationalisation."'
The threat of re-nationalization continued throughout the
Thatcher years. Both the 1983 and 1989 Labour manifestos
pledged to re-nationalize many privatized industries." Re-
nationalization was an important issue during British
Telecom's ("BT") privatization. Prior to the sale the Thatcher
government tried to enhance the market value of the industry
to attract potential stockholders and to raise as much money
as possible for the treasury. Concurrently, the Tories were
trying to float the shares before the impending election so
that Labour would be unable to re-nationalize. Yet Labour's
allegiance to re-nationalization caused the price of BT shares
to fall."
The LP continued to support re-nationalization during the
British Shipbuilders 1988 privatization. This time the
Thatcher government did not float shares but rather sold the
business directly to a private purchaser. The effect was the
same according to Labour-the industry had been taken from
the public in a for-profit sale to a private individual. This sale
jeopardized the jobs of over 2,000 union members." Bryan
'British Aerospace; Risk of Break-Up, ECONOMIST, July 28, 1979, at 90.
7 See 1983 Labour Manifesto, Labour Party (1983); see also 1989 Labour
Manifesto, Labour Party (1989).
' British Telecom; Shareholders Suffer, ECONOMIST, July 12, 1986, at 74
(stating that "[tihe fall-the biggest since BT was floated 19 months ago-
[sic] was prompted by a statement from Britain's Labour party suggesting
that it plans to renationalise BT if it wins the next election.").
'See Michael Cassell, Verdict on Wear Shipyards Put Off, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1988, at 30.
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Gould, Labour's trade and industry spokesperson, warned
"that the future of British shipbuilding was 'too important to
be sacrificed on the altar of privatisation.' "'s
The Thatcher transformation has not substantially altered
the Labour's current agenda. The 1991 Labour manifesto does
not call for sweeping re-nationalization, but seeks instead to
re-nationalize several industries, including the water indus-
try." By 1990 it had become obvious that the water industry
would be targeted for re-nationalization because water had
become increasingly polluted and more expensive during
privatization. 2 In March 1990, Ann Taylor, the Labour
spokesperson on water, noted that "the present regional
structure of the industry would be retained but a return to
public ownership would be a high priority."i" Capitalizing on
the water conditions, Ms. Taylor continued: "the starting point
for a Labour government would be a commitment to an
affordable supply of clean water for everyone and that Labour
believed that the interest of a private monopoly industry would
inevitably be in conflict with this aim." 4 Labour reiterated
its commitment to re-nationalize the water industry shortly
after releasing the manifesto. The London Times reported
Labour's intentions:
One of the first acts of a Labour government would be
to introduce consumer rights and environmental
controls on the privatised water companies, Ann Taylor,
Labour's environment protection spokesman, [sic] told
the [Labour party] conference ... [tihe party is commit-
ted to re-nationalising the water industry ... [wiater
privatisation had confirmed Labour's worst fears, she
said, leading to restricted access to public land, worse
10 Id.
" See Sheila Gunn, How Policies Have Changed Since Foot's Manifesto,
THE TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at 7.
1 See Michael Clark, Falls in Water Shares Set to Level Off, THE TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1990, at 30 (discussing the fall in water industry shares due to
fears of re-nationalization); see also Ivan Fallon, Labour Discards State
Control, THE TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, at 2 (stating that "a future Labour
government is still intent on grabbing back" the water industry).
13 Richard Evans & Andrew Hill, Water Share Price Upset by Labour
Plan, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at 24.
14Id.
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pollution, and huge pay awards for directors.'5
Labour also remains committed to re-nationalizing at least
part of the electrical industry, especially the National Grid.'6
When the electricity industry was privatized in 1990 the
Tories recognized the possibility of a Labour re-nationaliza-
tion:
A partial sell-off would make it an obvious candidate
for re-nationalisation if the opposition Labour party
were to win the next general election, they [the U.K.
government] said.., if 49 pct [sic] of the power indus-
try stays under state control, a Labour government
would only have to buy two pct [sic] of the shares to
renationalise it.'
The Tories were concerned that the LP would re-nationalize
the National Grid. Because the National Grid was owned by
twelve distributors whose profits primarily accrued from
dividends, the LP could target it as an example of Tory profit-
seeking.'8 The 1991 Labour manifesto, therefore, characteris-
tically promised to return the National Grid to public owner-
ship.
19
The LP remains committed to re-nationalization of the
hospital trusts, a division of the National Health Service (the
"NHS"). While Labour has not promised to re-nationalize the
entire NHS, it remains committed to re-nationalizing the
hospital trusts. Political observers regard Labour as the party
better able to capitalize on issues involving social services
because Labour emphasizes the importance of suitable and
1" Sheila Gunn, Controls Pledged for Water, THE TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at
7.
16 The National Grid transmits electricity through power lines to the
regional electricity companies ("RECs"). The RECs then carry the electricity
from the National Grid to local consumers. The National Grid is a separate
entity and therefore an obvious target for re-nationalization efforts.
1 Jane Merriman, UK Power Sell-Off Seen Carrying Big Political Risk,
Reuters, May 10, 1990, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Omni File.
is See Andrew Lorenz & Rufus Olins, Selling Power to the People, THE
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at 7.
"' See Gunn, supra note 11; see also Electricity Privatisation, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 17, 1990, at 76 ('Labour has pledged to take the national grid back into
public control.").
19931
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affordable health care.2 ' Labour's promise to re-nationalize
the trusts will also be politically advantageous because many
British voters are concerned that the Tories will privatize the
NHS.
21
Labour's promise to repurchase a majority of BT's shares
further demonstrates its commitment to public ownership.
The possibility of re-nationalization during BT's sale caused a
plunge in BT's sale price.22 The Tories seriously considered
selling off state owned BT shares to protect it from re-national-
ization." Recently, labor renewed its promise to become a
majority shareholder in BT. In addition, "The seven-year-old
privatisation of British Telecom faced a threat of another sort:
intentions to re-nationalise the company were periodically
pronounced by the opposition Labour Party until as recently as
August [1991]. "24 The 1991 Labour manifesto expressed an
intent to acquire a majority stake in BT.25 Labour's re-
nationalization commitment illustrates a long-term goal that
could be realized in a future Labour government.
Despite the preference for share ownership of some
segments of British society, and despite the immense cost of
re-nationalization, the Labour continues to advocate state
ownership. At least one prominent political journalist, Tony
Blair, has asserted that Britain's current political climate
indicates a responsiveness to revival of the market and state
economy. "[T]he potential for advance by socialist and social
democratic parties has not been greater for many decades.
The 1980s saw a frontal attack on the public sector by
governments claiming to act on behalf of the individual. In
2 See Labour and the NHS, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 1991, at 16 (MThe
National Health Service has long been Labour's trump card.").
21 See id. ("Labour's promise to take them [hospital trusts] back within
the management of the health authority will be popular among voters who
question the government's motives on the NHS...").
22 See British Telecom; Shareholders Suffer, supra note 8.
2 See also Labour and Industry, FIN. TMES, Jun. 11, 1990, at 16; see
British Telecom, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at 16; see also Hugo Dixon, State
May Delay BT Stake Sale, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1991, at 6 ("Labour policy is
to take the company back into public ownership only if the government
stake remains at 49 per cent.").
24 Karen Lynch, World Telecommunications 2, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991,
at 11.
2 See Fallon, supra note 12 (the 1991 Labour manifesto pledged to buy
"the extra few per cent of BT to take its stake above 50%.").
[Vol. 14:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss2/4
BRITISH RE-NATIONALIZATION
the 1990s the agenda for 'public action' is back." 6 Because
the Labour's agenda continues to reflect Great Britain's
economic concerns, Labour will be able initiate areas such as
state ownership when it is in power.
The essential values of the country, actually socialist
values, remain: the right to own property and create
wealth, but also social justice, the removal of poverty
and the reduction of inequality; the need for a market
economy, but also for market intervention in the
interests of the community. People want public services
to be accessible and of high quality, but they do not
want them privatised or run for profit.2"
3. PRESSURE ON THE LABOUR PARTY
Party members and officials do not alone determine a
political party's agenda. Rather, each party is sensitive to the
current political, social, and economic issues and respond
according to party philosophy. For example, Labour's political
agenda during the 1980s was responsive to the changes that
Thatcherism brought to Great Britain. Thatcher's government
had transformed the British political agenda by compelling
even her political opponents to focus on the priorities she set
and, in part, to adopt policy solutions devised during her
administration. Nationalization, therefore, remains an
important priority for the LP, due in part to the Tory's
rampant privatization.
Rank and file Labour members are pressuring the Labour
party to develop a political agenda different from the one
adopted by the leadership. The young socialists constantly
exhort the LP to implement radical social and economic
policies, such.as nationalization without compensation, or at
the very least, they suggest that compensation should be need-
based.2" With over three hundred branches at the constituen-
cy level, the young socialists are politically significant.
Therefore, Labour's emphasis on re-nationalization is impor-
IS Tony Blair, Labour's Agenda: Socialism in a Free Market, THE TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1991, at 4.
27 1
2sSee Young Socialists; How Left Can You Get?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6,
1976, at 27.
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tant to the young socialists, as well as to Labour's electoral
success. Labour acknowledges that a failure to appease the
young socialists and their followers may weaken its hopes for
election.
Many Labourites remain loyal to the party's socialist
objectives and attempt to influence Labour's platform accord-
ingly. Rebel left-wingers remain in the party and were pivotal
during the 1991 elections. In the May 1991 council elections,
rebel left-wingers won five of the six wards in which they
challenged official Labour candidates.2  The traditional
Labourites may cause the Labour party to cling to its socialist
ideals. Rebel left-wingers have accused the current Labour
party of being "wedded to the capitalist system,"" and of
"moving much closer to the Thatcherite consensus.""'
Nationalization, a backbone of socialist ideology, will be a
critical issue for Labour to address in order to maintain the
support of its traditional constituents. As a result, labour may
modify its current position, limiting the number of industries
it proposes to renationalize to better conform to the views the
rebel Labourites espouse.
Other factors, such as the success of other political parties,
influence the Labour. One such party is the Scottish National
Party (the "SNP"). Although the SNP was established many
years ago, its power increased dramatically during the 1970s,
due to the discovery of oil in the North Sea. 2 By 1989, the
SNP controlled 21% of the Scottish vote.3" The September
1991 election of Jim Sillars to SNP leader sparked a leftward
political revision designed to attract Labourites. This revision
entailed plans for re-nationalization in the electricity, gas and
transport industries.3 4
"' See Andrew Grice, Dying Heifer Labels Kinnock a Stalinist, THE
TIMES, June 2, 1991, at 7.
s0 I
3" Michael Cassell, Kinnock Package Approved, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 1989,
at 1 (quoting Tony Benn, left-wing IP for Chesterfield).
"s See The Four Lands, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1983, at 28. The SNP ran
on the slogan "It's Scotland's Oil" and won 30% of all the votes cast in
Scotland in the 1974 general election. Id.
33 Scots Aware, ECONOMIST, May 6, 1989, at 12.
"' See James Buxton, Sillars Wins SNP Deputy Leadership, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1991, at 8 (stating these "moves to the left were intended to attract
Labour voters.").
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The SNP platform has influenced Labour's platform. The
SNP is attempting to attract Labour voters by adopting Labour
positions, including wide-spread re-nationalization. Since the
SNP has become increasingly important to the LP's success,
the LP cannot disregard the SNP's maneuvers.3 5 The Labour
party's allegiance to limited re-nationalization is not only the
Labour leaders' priority but also a call for support from those
not generally sympathetic to the current leadership. Labour
should respond favorably to these pressures. A favorable
response includes commitment to re-nationalization.
4. THE POLITICAL DOWNSIDE TO PRIVATIZATION
Privatized industries have become an increasing liability to
the Conservative government. Presumably, privatization's
success has fueled its primary criticism-the British public,
especially the consumers, pay extraordinary rates while the
shareholders enjoy the fruits of increasing profits."6 For
example, British Telecom's 1990-1991 profits were 3.1 billion
pounds."" One water company, South West Water, had pre-
tax profits of 88.2 million pounds for 1990,8 while another,
North West Water, reported a 21% profit increase in 1990 to
215 million pounds.3" British Gas profited 1.6 billion pounds
in 1990.
40
The failure of privatization to uniformly enhance service
aggravates this problem. The water industry privatization
which resulted in deteriorating water quality illustrates these
service problems: "Britain's rivers are now more polluted with
sewage than before water privatisation, despite the rising
profits of water companies and higher charges to customers
, In November 1991 the Labour party took a district from the Conserva-
tive party in eastern Scotland. The Scottish National Party's support was
crucial to the Labour victory. See William E. Schmidt, Conservatives
Defeated in 2 British Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at 19.
, See Rivers Get Dirtier as Water Firms Divert Their Profits, THE TIMES,
Jun. 16, 1991, at 2.
8 Can the Regulators Hold Them, ECONOMIST, June 1, 1991, at 55.
Ross Tieman & John Young, Labour Steps Up Attack on Privatised
Profits Boom, THE TIMES, Jun. 3, 1991, at 22.
8 Rivers Get Dirtier as Water Firms Divert Their Profits, supra note 36.
40 Ross Tieman, Gas Makes Pounds 65 Profit from Each Small User, THE
TIMES, Nov. 8., 1991, at 3.
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
... [t]he number of sewage pollution incidents increased by
20% last year to 6,274."41 Furthermore,
North West Water, which reported a 21% profit rise to
Pounds 215m, runs 14 sewage works that discharge
illegal levels of sewage. South West Water, whose
profits increased 16.6% up to Pounds 51.4m, has 61
sewage works discharging illegal levels; Yorkshire
(profits up 12% to Pounds 114.1m) has 27 sewage works
in breach of limits; Anglian (9% to Pounds 153m), 32
illegal works; and Welsh Water, 59 illegal works.'
The critique ofprivatization has gained credibility from the
enormous salary increases industrial executives have recently
received. The salary of the chairman of Thames Water rose
over 100% in 1991 despite Britain's poor economic condi-
tion.4 "The rise reflects a basic pay increase, plus a special
bonus because Thames, the biggest of the privatised water
companies, exceeded its profit target."' Robert Evans, the
chairman of British Gas, took a 66% increase in June 1991;
John Baker, National Power, 58%; lain Vallance, British
Telecom, 12.5%."'
The Conservative party has suffered from the recent
privatization controversy because privatization forces it to sit
on a political fence. The Conservative government enticed the
shareholders with a real chance for profitable investment."
"[Shareholders, unlike customers, like big profits," because it
means larger dividends.4 Shareholder satisfaction depends
upon the privatized industries' ability to amass large profits
which in turn, anger the British public. The Conservatives
can only please their loyal supporters, the shareholders, by
angering their sympathizers.
The economic climate which has resulted, in part, from
41 Rivers Get Dirtier as Water Firms Divert Their Profits, supra note 36.
42 ICE
41 Jeff Randall & Fiona Walsh, Water Chief Set to Double His Money,
THE TIMES, June 30, 1991, at 3.
44Id.
46 J
4Andrew Lorenz, BT Doctored Profits', THE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at 1.
"' Can the Regulators Hold Them, supra note 37.48 d.
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privatization has led to skepticism of the Conservative party.
Many of the industries operate as privatized monopolies.
Although the industries have been removed from state control,
they have not broken down. The increasing prices and profits
of the large privatized monopolies force a high rate of infla-
tion.49 The RPI-minus-X scheme which regulates profit in an
attempt to check inflation has not worked. 0 In addition to
privatization's other problems, it also causes an inflation spiral
which the government has difficulty regulating through the
private monopolies."M
The problems with privatization have had a negative
impact on the Conservative party. "With the bull market over,
many voters may now be more concerned about inflationary
threats than excited about popular capitalism.""2 The condi-
tion of the privatized industries in comparison to the average
consumer and voter has engendered discontent among the
electorate. Eventually, Labour may capitalize on this discon-
tent. Labour has "stepped up its attack on the profitability of
privatised utilities in a renewed effort to ensure that the
question becomes an electoral issue.""3
Marjorie Mowlam, shadow minister for corporate
affairs, called for a government review of regulatory
controls, to ensure that 'excessive' profits at British
Telecom and British Gas were used to improve services.
Speaking in East Kilbride, she said: 'The public
know [sic] when they are being ripped off, and when it
comes to the crunch I believe they will vent their anger
and frustration at the ballot box."'
The Labour's commitment to re-nationalization is increas-
'Id.
s See John Plender, Tilting at Tory Monopolists, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1988, at 23 (stating that "the process of privatising state monopolies
threatens to institutionalise a form of inflation that the public sector
ownership had gone a long way towards eradicating.")
621 &d
's Tieman & Young, supra note 38.
"4Id; see also Randall & Walsh, supra note 43 ("Labour politicians will
be quick to seize on Watts's pay rise as another example of company
chairmen cashing in while ordinary workers are asked to accept moderate
increases.")
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ingly advantageous given the recent political fallout from of
privatization. Labour's commitment to re-nationalization will
become more attractive the more the British economy fails and
the privatized industries suffer from poor publicity. Labour
will capitalize on public sentiment; re-nationalization will
therefore become an increasing possibility. Re-nationalization,
especially in the utilities, is seen as a way to stop the abuses
of privatization. In a speech made at the Labour party
conference in 1989, Neil Kinnock voiced his concern over the
privatization of utilities:
The people know, as we know, that it is simply wrong
to put vital utilities of this kind into the hands of
private monopolies, not least because they know, as we
know, that the whole trust of privatisation collides head
on with the concern for the environment. Privatisation
of water and electricity also puts a hold straight
through the Government's claim to be guardians of the
environment.5"
5. STATE LIABILITY TO SHAREHOLDERS
The possibility of re-nationalization raises important legal
issues, including state liability to the shareholders of privat-
ized industries. If any of the privatized industries are re-
nationalized in accordance with Labour's political agenda,
many shareholders will lose possession of their shares. Those
shares will be subject to public ownership and state control.
The state's liability to the shareholders in this situation is
complex. British law does not mandate compensation."
Compensation is an issue that will not be decided until re-
nationalization occurs and the terms of compensation are
statutorily promulgated.57 Yet these terms may not satisfy
shareholders, who may challenge them in the courts. While
"' Neil Kinnock, Speech at the Labour Party Conference in Brighton, Oct.
3, 1989.
"' Like the United States, Great Britain is a common law country. Legal
precedent is ordinarily binding on subsequent cases involving the same
issue. Nevertheless, subsequent cases are often distinguished from binding
precedent.
7 See Nationalization Policy, Bus. INT'L, Aug. 1987 ("Each nationalisa-
tion case is subject to a different parliamentary bill.").
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the courts might sanction compensation for a specific case, the
approved scheme will not necessarily bind other re-national-
ization endeavors.
This process may become increasingly complex since the
cost of any compensation would drain the British treasury,
possibly devastate the economy, and consequently damage the
LP"8 Thus, the LP may seek alternative forms of state
control, including majority state ownership or substantial
regulation. In addition, Labour may consider various forms of
compensation, including fair market value (a complex legal
issue in its own right), state controlled shares, or making other
entities responsible for compensation. These alternatives raise
questions of legality under British law.
6. PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSATION
Britain's economic structure significantly changed during
the 1940s and 1950s. Throughout this period the LP institut-
ed consensus politics primarily based on Keynesian economics.
Dennis Kavanagh, a prominent British political scholar, has
discussed the application of Keynesianism to post-war British
domestic policy:
The package of policies on the domestic front is famil-
iar: full employment budgets; the greater acceptance-
even conciliation-of the trade unions; whose bargain-
ing position was strengthened by an increased member-
ship and full employment; public ownership of the basic
or monopoly services and industries; state provision of
social welfare, requiring in turn high public expenditure
and taxation; and economic management of a sort, via
a large public sector and a reduced role for the mar-
ket.
59
Essentially, Keynesian economics expands the arena of
governmental intervention. It allows for the nationalization
of industries, the primacy of trade unions, and government
" See Cassell, supra note 31 (stating that Mr. Bryan
Gould, Shadow Trade and Industry Secretary, "warned that any suggestion
of confiscation of privately owned assets would be 'electorally disastrous' [to
Labour]."); see also HARRIS, supra note 1, at 185 (finding that in 1988 there
were nine million shareholders in Great Britain).
59 KAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 34.
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
owned housing. Keynesian economics in practice constructs a
'Welfare State.' Although the tenets of this economic theory
best suit the ideals of the LP, the Conservative party resigned
itself to many of its ideas during the consensus period from
1945 to 1970.
Labour has pursued policies in accordance with Keynesian
dogma. The governments of the post-war consensus played an
important role in the economy. For example, "for most [of] the
inter-war years state spending rarely exceeded 25 per cent of
the GNP; since 1945 it has never fallen below 36.5 per
cent."00 Labour began a surge toward nationalizing major
industries and monopolies; much of the country's economic
framework therefore came under state control during this
time.
Labour implemented these economic changes through
statute. One commentator has described the legal nationaliza-
tion:
Most of the main Acts have a similar form. They begin
by prescribing the position of the new corporation and
its governing board, its powers, and duties. Then the
terms of compensation are set out, followed by the
financial arrangements of the new body. The principle
of full compensation had been accepted, after some
argument, by the Labour Party between the wars. The
Acts provided for the compulsory replacement (usually
at market value on a certain day) of existing stocks and
shares by new fixed-interest stock, which carried no
ownership rights but which could be bought and sold
like other Government securities.6"
Compensation, then, during the consensus period was statuto-
rily determined and implemented in accordance with the
Parliament's decision.62 The major nationalization efforts
were achieved through statute, including: the Bank of
England Act 1946, the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946,
the Civil Aviation Act 1946, the Transport Act 1946, the
60 Id. at 31-32.
61 LEONARD J. TIvEY, NATIONALISATION IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 43 (1966).
" See NATIONALIZATION: A BOOK OF READINGS 18 (A.H. Hanson ed.,
1963) ("[C]ompensation to the former owners of their assets has been one of
their [nationalized industries] first financial obligations.").
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Electricity Act 1947, the Gas Act 1948 and the Iron and Steel
Act 1949." These statutes all included specific provisions for
compensating private shareholders. For example, the Coal
Industry Nationalisation Act of 1946 provides that:
[t]he compensation to be made in respect of the inter-
ests vested as aforesaid of a body administering a
central selling scheme in such stocks as aforesaid shall
be of an amount equal to the value thereof as deter-
mined, in default of agreement between the Minister
and the trustees for that bond, by arbitration under this
Act, shall be satisfied by a money payment made to
those trustees, and, when paid, shall be dealt with as if
it had been money received by that body in respect of
sale of coal."
Parliament also mandated compensation in other statutes
including the Transport Act of 1962: "[a] stock holder in
respect of whose holding any such stock or share certificate or
similar document is outstanding shall be entitled under the
said Regulations of 1943, or any regulations replacing those
regulations, to a stock certificate".,5 Yet the Transport Act
of 1962 vested discretion in the Minister in determining proper
compensation: "[an order under this section [§83) may
contain such consequential and supplementary provisions,
including provisions for the assessment of compensation, as
the Minister may think fit, and notice of the order shall be
published in such manner and form as the Minister may
direct."6  Furthermore, the Aircraft and Shipbuilding
Industries Act of 1977 provides that "[c]ompensation for the
vesting in a Corporation by virtue of this Part of this Act of
the securities of any company shall be satisfied by the issue of
government stock".
6 7
Thus, compensation of shareholders pursuant to national-
ization has always been statutorily decided."8 Re-nationaliza-
63 See TONY PROSSER, NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC CONTROL
22 (1986).
64 Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, 10 Geo. 6, ch. 59.
65 Transport Act 1962, 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 46, sch. 7.
*'I6i. § 83.
17 Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, 25 Eliz. 2, ch. 3, § 35.
6" Interestingly, the statutes providing for privatization during the
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tion of industry, although a strong possibility during the next
Labour government, has not occurred. Therefore, compensa-
tion for future re-nationalization ia a matter of speculation.
While the terms of compensation will probably be statutorily
mandated, the amount of compensation remains uncertain."9
Although most of the nationalization statutes provide for
compensation, they generally do not indicate the actual
amount. For example, the Coal Nationalisation Act of 1946
provides for a "money payment,"70 but the statute does not
specify actual compensation. Other statutes provide for
calculating compensation. For example, the Aircraft and
Shipbuilding Act of 1977 provides that "the amount of compen-
sation due to any person in respect of any securities of a
company which are held by him immediately before the date
of transfer of that company shall be an amount equal to the
base value of those securities".7 1 Yet even these provisions
do not include specific provisions for computation.
The British legal system is left to interpret the proper level
of compensation to shareholders. The courts have traditionally
interpreted the amount of compensation to be the fair market
value of the shares. 2 Although neither the courts nor
Parliament are bound to this interpretation, fair market value
has been a customary interpretation.
Once the court has interpreted the level of compensation as
the fair market value of the shares, the court must further
compute the monetary equivalent of the fair market value.
This compensation computation has troubled democratic courts
in many instances. 3 Identifying the day upon which the
Thatcher era also furnish compensation to the employees of previously
nationalised industries. See British Steel Act 1988, 35 Eliz. 2, ch. 35, § 3.
See generally TIVEY, supra note 61, at 182-89.
SId. (citing the Coal Nationalisation Act).
71 Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, supra note 67.
72 See Morgan v. Tate and Lyle, [1952] T.R. 477.
" For example, the United States courts employ the appraisal rights
model for calculating compensation. The appraisal rights model compen-
sates the American shareholder with the fair market value of her shares,
predating the effects of a rumored merger or nationalization. See Thomas
D. Hall, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums and Minority
Discounts, 31 EmoRY L. J. 139, (1982) ("shareholders typically have the
right to force the corporation to purchase their shares at fair market
value."). Yet, application of the appraisal rights model has led to various
results. The courts have given different values weights to the effects of
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value of the shares will be assessed presents the main
problem. The market value of the shares invariably depends
on the effect of nationalization."" Because the statutes
ordinarily did not specify the amount of compensation, they
did not specify the date for assessment either. The ambiguous
date of valuation fosters legal controversy.
Although the LP may institute nationalization along with
a statute providing for fair market value, this value itself will
engender controversy. "Labour leaders have stressed that
whatever form of public ownership is introduced, shares will
be bought back at the market price." 5 Yet, market price is
necessarily variable. Nationalization can severely depress a
stock's market value.
In Labour's policy review, the relevant phrase covering
repurchase of shares is that they would be bought at "a
fair market price." Understandably, people thought
this to mean that a Labour Government would not go
out of its way to depress the price in advance of re-
nationalisation. But the review went on to say that all
the major utilities would become "public interest
companies" each with its own "public interest commis-
sion" who would set pricing policy according to "interest
which are wider than those of the shareholder and their
owners." Mr. Kinnock was not able to disown Mr.
Gould, because Mr. Gould was merely setting out what
was implied in the policy review. The words "fair
market price" can after all, justify re-nationalisation
nationalization. See Joel Seligman, American Law Institutes's Corporate
Governance Project: Remedies: Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 829, 855 (1984) ("The weighting process appears to be
indefensibly arbitrary and capricious.").
"' For example, the French government was criticized for undercompen-
sating shareholders when the several industries were nationalized in the
early 1980s. The French government recognizedthe effect of nationalization
and therefore averaged the share value in 1978, 1979, 1980. Yet, these
efforts did not compensate adequately, according to some shareholders. See
A Less-Than Franc Exchange, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 14, 1981, at 99 ("While that
[effort] eliminates any depression of the Paris bourse as a consequence of
the Mitterrand election victory, it is probably an inadequate proxy for
market value at the time of nationalisation.")
'r Evans & Hill, supra note 13.
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without compensation if the business is worthless.7 6
The water industry has already demonstrated the problem
of the depressing effect. In April 1990 shareholders in the
water industry were already suffering from the threat of
Labour re-nationalization. The share value was plummeting
in anticipation of the upcoming election. "[F]ears of re-
nationalization" led to a "sharp fall in the [value of] water
company stock."' Furthermore, in March 1991 the depress-
ing effects continued: "U.K. Shares closed lower in moderately
active trading, depressed by political and economical worries
.... [T]he weekend polls depressed water shares in particular
as analysts said water company shareholders feared a Labour
government would re-nationalise the companies if it were
elected into government." 8
Thus the threat of re-nationalization will depress the
market value of shares in many privatized companies. If a
Labour government should re-nationalize the industry, the
monetary equivalent of fair market value (if statutorily
mandated) will be controversial. Legal precedent indicates
that unless a statute specifically accounts for the depressing
effect, the fair market value of the shares will be equal to their
monetary value on the vesting or transfer date."9
In Studholme v. Minister of Fuel and Power, the plaintiff
held stock in a gas company nationalized under the Gas Act of
1948.0 "[B]etween 1945 and the Vesting date, the threat of
nationalization, consequent on the result of the general
election [in 1945], depressed the prices of comparable securi-
ties and the company's securities.""' Section 25(1) of the Gas
Act of 1948 provided that:
[e]very holder of securities of any undertaker to whom
this Part of this Act applies ... shall be entitled to be
compensated by the issue to him by the Gas Council, in
76 The Labour Party's Policy Review and the Utilities, FIN. TIMES, Sep.
26, 1990, at 27.
" Clark, supra note 12.
8 UK Stocks Close Lower on Worries and Profit-Taking, REUTER FIN.
REP., Mar. 25, 1991.
"' See Studholme v. Minister of Fuel and Power, 2 KLB. 804 (C.A. 1951).
"Id. at 806-07.
Si Id. at 809.
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accordance with the provisions of the second schedule
to this Act, of British Gas Stock of such amount as in
the opinion of the Treasury is at the vesting date of a
value equal to the value of the said securities held by
him, regard being had (in estimating the value of the
stock so issued) to the market value of government
securities at or about the vesting date. 2
During the period preceding the nationalization of the gas
industry the value of comparable stocks rose while the value
of gas shares declined."3 Therefore, the counsel for the
plaintiff "claimed that according to the true reading of sub-s.
(10) the tribunal, in making its valuation, must exclude any
effects that the Gas Act had on these later securities."' Yet,
the court denied the plaintiff's claim because the statute had
not accounted for the negative effect and therefore, neither
would the court. The court found that "[i]f it was intended to
exclude from consideration some matter of fact which was
there and which plainly did affect the subject-matter under
consideration, [one] should most certainly expect that Parlia-
ment deliberately and expressly so to have provided, as,
indeed, it is known it frequently does." 5 The court did not,
however, foreclose subsequent courts from accounting for other
factors as they believed necessary: "[I]t would be very
dangerous and wrong if this court now attempted to make a
complete and exhaustive category of the particular factors
which, in any given, case, the [tribunal] ought to take into
account." 6
The legal uncertainty regarding compensation to sharehold-
ers leaves many questions unanswered for future re-national-
ization. Studholme illustrates this uncertainty. A statute may
or may not provide for a fair market value standard. If it does
not, the courts must interpret the proper standard; if it does,
the courts must still interpret the proper value. If a statute
does not provide specific procedures for determining a stock's
s Id- at 807 & n.1 (quoting Gas Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 67, § 25).
83 Id at 811.
8I4 at 819.
s Id. at 820.
so Id- at 824.
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value,"7 courts are left to decide the method of calculation
and the value. Even if the courts respect the Parliament's
silence, as in Studholme, they still determine the terms of
compensation because they do not compensate for the depress-
ing effect of nationalization." Because the method of calcula-
tion for compensation is not legally mandated, Labour has an
opportunity to manipulate the value.
7. LABOUR'S DIFFICULTY WITH THE
FAIR MARKET VALUE STANDARD
The Labour party would have difficulty keeping its pledge
to re-nationalize several privatized industries if it mandates a
fair market value standard which compensates for nationaliza-
tion's depressing effect. First, the money required to re-
nationalize the privatized industries would severely strain the
British economy. By December 1989, "over 600,000 jobs [had
been transferred] to the private sector ... and the state
industries' share of GNP will have fallen to around 6 1/2%.""
By July 1990 "27.5 billion of state-owned assets [had been
returned] to the private sector."90 The money needed to
finance re-nationalization would drain the British Treasury
and cause economic difficulties. The final cost would be even
greater because the state would then have to fund the newly
nationalized industries. According the Appropriation Act of
1988, the "expenditure by the Department of Transport on
support to nationalised transport industries and to ports;
rebate of fuel duty to bus operators; and costs of the driver
testing and training organisation," was budgeted for
87 Some statutes have tried to account for the depressing effect of
nationalization and have compensated for it. In that case the courts would
certainly defer to the parliament's intent. See id; see also Aircraft and
Shipbuilding Industries Act, 1977, supra note 67 ("Where compensation
stock falls ... the amount of stock ... is equal on the date of issue to that
amount of compensation, regard being had (in estimating the value of the
compensation stock so issued) to the market value of other government
securities at or about that date.").
8 The Studholme court did not compensate for the depressing effect of
nationalisation when determining the fair market value of the shares. See
Studholme, supra note 79.8 8 Britain Leads the Way, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1985, at 83.
"o Business Overview-Political Assessment, ECON. PUB., Jul. 1, 1990.
[Vol. 14:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss2/4
BRITISH RE-NATIONALIZATION
24,700,000 pounds.91
8. LESS THAN FAIR COMPENSATION
Given the expense of to re-nationalization, Labour must
consider alternative methods of nationalization or compensa-
tion in order to avert political suicide. In the past the Labour
party has suggested nationalization with less than fair market
value compensation. For example, some commentators assert
that the depressing effect of nationalization should not be
considered because the shareholders were given a discount on
market value when shares were initially offered.92 Further-
more, when Labour nationalized the Shipbuilding Industry in
1977, Tony Benn, a prominent Labourite, suggested compensa-
tion without considering nationalization's depressing effect on
stock values. One article noted reaction to such a proposal:
As for the compensation terms, shipbuilders are up in
arms against Mr. Benn's proposal to use average share
prices for the six months up to February 28, 1974, the
date of the election that brought Labour to power. This
period was affected by the three-day week and also by
fears that Labour would indeed win. [In any event,
there is no strong case for the City's hope that compen-
sation would be based on asset values.93
Current shareholders have expressed concern that the
Labour party will not fully compensate under nationalization.
When the LP refused to incorporate the European Convention
on Human Rights into British law in January 1990, many
critics claimed that Labour planned to compensate private
shareholders at less than fair market value upon re-nationaliz-
ing. One commentator noted:
Labour's argument against incorporating the European
Convention as at least part of a Bill of Rights is ...
[that it would mean] protecting rights with which parts
of the Labour Party are out of sympathy. It would
31 Appropriation Act, 1988, ch. 38.
32 See Denationalisation, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1979, at 108 (the market
value accounts for "[t]he discount on market value that is normally offered
to tempt investors when shares are offered for sale").
"Fair Bargain in the Shipyards?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 1975, at 78.
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almost certainly protect the public schools,"4 for in-
stance, and the rights of people who have bought shares
in the privatized industries, such as British Gas and
British Telecom, to fair compensation if they are ever
re-nationalized. 5
Labourites have also called for nationalization or re-
nationalization without any compensation at all. The young
socialists have traditionally regarded compensation as an
unnecessary benefit to those who have invested in a system
that serves the wealthy. In the past, the young socialists have
made "numerous calls for nationalisation of just about
everything-without compensation or with compensation on
the basis of need only."96 Similarly, Neil Kinnock, the Labour
party leader, has called for nationalization without compensa-
tion. 7 Nationalization without full compensation is not only
a political necessity for the Labour in the future but is also on
the political agenda of several party members.
Although a presumption favoring fair market value exists,
there are several alternatives to the fair market value system
in legal precedent. Historically British law has varied from
offering compensation above fair market value to compensation
less than fair market value." Until the Land Act of 1919,
landowners were compensated above fair market value.99
"Great Britain formerly required that condemnees receive
9' These schools operate as private schools would in the United States.
95Julia Neuberger, Labour's Half-Hearted Step to a Bill of Rights, THE
TwIEs, Jan. 10, 1990, at 12.
" Young Socialists, How Left Can You Get, supra note 28.
97 See ERIC HEFFER, NEVER A YES MAN (1991) (Eric Heifer, a life-long
Labourite and companion of Neil Kinnock, asserts that Neil Kinnock
espoused the idea of nationalization without compensation); see also Grice,
supra note 29 (recognizing that Neil Kinnock has called for nationalization
without compensation).
" During the postwar era, many European countries, including Britain,
compensated less than full market value for nationalization. See Oscar
Schachter, Comment, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INTL L.
121, 124 (1984) ("It was clear that European state practice showed
substantial deviation from what one would ordinarily understand as 'full'
compensation or as prompt and effective payment... [and] examination of
state practice in cases of postwar nationalization showed that compensation
was less than full value (or fair market value)").
" Land Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 57.
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110% of fair market value as compensation."1°° However,
one scholar has noted that "[i]n some cases [compensation in
excess of fair market value] would undoubtedly provide the
condemnee vith a windfall, and could thus produce a kind of
tertiary rent seeking; property owners might maneuver to get
their property condemned in circumstances where they would
receive bonus compensation."'01 In fact, large compensation
awards were one reason for repealing the generous Land Act
statute.
102
There is also British legal precedent for compensation at
less than fair market value.1'0 Regina v. Lithgow'" is a
prominent case sanctioning the "less than fair market value"
system. 05  In that case, the government acquired the
plaintiff's shares when the aircraft and shipbuilding industries
were nationalized in 1977." The plaintiffs claimed that the
compensation paid for their shares was grossly inadequate in
comparison to their market value."° Their claim relied on
the fact that British nationals were paid far less compensation
than were foreigners who owned shares in the same industry.
10 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL LAW
REV. 61, 92 n.97 (1986).
101 Id at 92.
102 See id. at 92 n.97.
10' See National Coal Board v. Brook, [1970] R.A. 448, 448 (1970)
(accepting the fact that "[a]t the time of nationalisation, compensation for
the heap [of coal] had been claimed and paid in respect of only 15,000 [of the
208,000] tons of material."); see also Petroleum Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5,
ch. 36, § 2 (which nationalized the nation's petroleum without compensa-
tion).
04 Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
1 (1986).
105
[T]he European Court of Human Rights resolved a long and bitterly argued
dispute by rejecting claims for more compensation by former private
shareholders of shipbuilding and aircraft companies that were nationalised
in 1977 by a Labour government. Disappointed claimants are urging BT
shareholders to sell now, to avoid a similar fate.
British Telecom, Shareholders Suffer, supra note 8.1 4 See Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, supra note 67.
'o
7 See Raymond Hughes, Government Accused of Being Inflexible, FIN.
TIMES, June 27, 1985, at 7 (the plaintiffs objected because "the payment of
compensation.., was not reasonably related to the value of their property
when it was taken.").
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Nevertheless, the European Court found that a state can
distinguish between nationals and non-nationals and that the
British nationals were adequately compensated in this
case.' The British court affirmed this result."0 9
The argument for compensation based on less than market
value for British nationals is sound for several reasons.
British citizens receive benefits from the state that can make
up for compensation of less than fair market value. According
to one scholar, "there are compelling considerations of fairness
that may justify not applying the same rules to aliens as to
nationals.""0 Unlike British nationals, the non-nationals
"do not share equally with citizens in the benefits accruing to
the polity as a whole from the 'balancing' and arguably should
not have to bear the commensurate burdens."" "[Tihe
United Kingdom did not violate international law by taking
the property of its own nationals for less than full compensa-
tion but could not do so with respect to foreign-owned proper-
ty.""
x2
Furthermore, the public interest at stake, state ownership
of industry, is more important than the full compensation of
individuals who risked money in the stock market. At least
one scholar has accepted this rationale: "a fair balance must
be struck between the demands of the community's general
interests and the requirements of the protection of the
Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40. Other courts have distinguished
between nationals and non-nationals regarding compensation for national-
ization. In INA Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, The Hague, Aug. 13, 1985, the American plaintiffs sought
compensation for their ownership interest in Bimeh Sharqh, an Iranian
insurance company. The court awarded full market value compensation to
the Americans, disregarding the depressing effect of nationalization. See
generally Monroe Leigh, Decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
Expropriation-Standard of Compensation Under International Law--"Fair
Market Value" Versus "Prompt, Adequate and Effective Compensation", 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 181, 181-82 (1986).
100 Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40 ("I have reached the conclusion that
this matter should go no further and should be killed here and now.")
Although the court found that the case was time barred on remand, it
affirmed the result.
1 Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INTIL L.
474, 494 (1991).
. Id. (citation omitted).
112 Id.
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individual's fundamental rights.""' Additionally, the Euro-
pean Court additionally found that "legitimate objectives of
'public interest,' such as measures of economic and social
reform, could call for compensation at less than full market
value.""4
Since nationalization is an important public interest,
compensation for nationalization can be less than the amount
which is adequate for other public takings. In this respect it
has been noted that:
[a] decision to enact nationalisation legislation will
commonly involve consideration of various issues on
which opinions within a democratic society may reason-
ably differ widely. Because of their direct knowledge of
their society and its needs and resources, . . . the
margin of appreciation available to them [the national
authorities] should be a wide one. It would, in the
Court's view, be artificial in this respect to divorce the
decision as to the compensation terms from the actual
decision to nationalise, since the factors influencing the
latter will of necessity also influence the former. [Ilt
will respect the legislature's judgment in this connec-
tion unless that judgment was manifestly without
reasonable foundation.1 5
In other words, Parliament will determine the terms for
compensation in the statute regarding nationalization; these
terms are satisfactory as long as the legislature sanctions
them. Parliament can take the cost of nationalization into
account, and thus reduce the terms of compensation to make
nationalization possible. The public interest in nationalization
will outweigh the necessity for individual compensation.
Some critics of the compensation system have argued that
consistent with the risk involved in investment, the purchase
price accounts for the risk of nationalization." 6 Compensa-
"' Monroe Leigh, Decision of the European Court of Human Rights,
European Human Rights Convention - Compensation to Nationals Following
Expropriation of Property, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 425, 426 (1987).
1 4 1 at 427.
115 Id.
116 See John Wilson, Will Electricity Be a Good Investment, THE TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 33 ("The aim should be to give investors a long-term
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tion is not necessary, therefore, when the element of chance
disfavors the investor. These observers further argue that
insurance companies could compensate investors in time of re-
nationalization. 7 Using privatization in Eastern Europe as
a model, "one leading U.S. insurance industry executive says
that international firms participating in the privatization of
state-owned companies in developing regions of the world owe
it to their shareholders to protect those investments against
're-nationalization'." s  Therefore, "[i]t is impossible for
investment analysts to predict such loss-generating intangible
factors such as political risk, but responsible firms should turn
to the insurance industry to remove the uncertainty inherent
in any privatization program."" 9 British courts have not
considered the insurance alternative. Although the alternative
remains available, it is not a legally sanctioned form of
compensation. The LP could politically benefit if it cites
insurance as a possibility, but declines to apply it to British re-
nationalization.
Given the expense of re-nationalization and its effect on the
British treasury, the LP may consider compensation for less
than fair market value. Several Labour members have already
indicated a willingness to consider this alternative. This
compensation system would allow them to adhere to their
agenda of re-nationalizing some British industries. Further,
it would minimize the cost of re-nationalization and save the
British treasury from depletion. The LP could also promulgate
terms of fair market value but not compensate for the depress-
ing effect of nationalization. These legally available alterna-
tives would practically enable the LP to re-nationalize.
return commensurate with the risks involved in the industry.").
11 See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western
and Third World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 n.2
(1983) (stating that '[ijnvestors frequently can obtain some type of political
risk insurance against nationalization.").
"' Insurance Industry Leader Says Firms Investing in Eastern Europe
Privatization Should Guard Against 'Re-Nationalization', Bus. Wire, July
11, 1991; see also Phillip R. Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated-Dames &
Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a New Raid on the Treasury, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 317, 382 (1984) (finding that "Congress has implemented an
insurance program against foreign nationalizations.").
"S Insurance Industry Leader Says Firms Investing in Eastern Europe
Privatization Should Guard Against 'Re-Nationalization," supra note 118.
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9. REGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO RE-NATIONALIZATION
Although the political climate will probably allow for the
re-nationalization of some industries, Labour could not
politically afford wide-spread re-nationalization with a reduced
compensation system. However, the public disgust with the
large profit margin enjoyed by privatized industries demands
governmental attention. "The complaints [about profits of
privatized industries] have grown louder as British Gas and
some of the water companies have also unveiled fatter profits
this week, despite the recession. Tory backbenchers have
joined Labour in demanding that something be done."12
Currently, many of the privatized industries operate as
monopolies. 1' While promoting competition may reduce
profit margins,"' 2 the state could police the industries more
closely than if the industries remained competitive.
The LP's preference for a close relationship between the
state and industry precludes it from fostering industrial
competition. Yet the governmenlt must take action regarding
these monopolies' large profit margins. Instead of immediate
re-nationalization, the LP could first impose strict regula-
tion.' The current regulation system has not minimized
profits.
Their main method of control is the pricing formula
known as "RPI-minus-x". This means that each firm
must limit its product-price rises inflation ... [i]f the
regulator reckons that the firm is earning too high a
monopoly profit, it can raise "x". So far, the regulators
have raised "x" each time they have reviewed it." M
Yet because monopoly profits continue to increase, the LP will
have to undertake much stricter controls. This degree of
regulation will reduce profit margins and will affect sharehold-
ers's investments. One journalist has suggested that the LP
"may impose very strict regulations, which may involve
110 Can the Regulators Hold Them, supra note 37.
1 See id.
See id.
11 See id. ("Big profits mean bad regulation").
124s Id
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dividend control." 25
Because stricter regulation will adversely affect sharehold-
ers, the issue of compensation arises. John Redwood, the
corporate affairs minister for the Conservative government,
has endorsed compensation for regulation. Mr. Redwood "was
considering giving new powers to the regulatory bodies
supervising the newly privatised nationalised industries. They
might be allowed to adjudicate in disputes between companies
and their individual customers. That could lead to compensa-
tion where a complaint was justified."'28
While Redwoods's policy incorporates the tenets of the
Conservative government, the LP cannot endorse it. First,
shareholders invested in the industry knowing that there was
risk; risk is inherent in any financial investment. Further-
more, compensating shareholders would mean that the
industries operate on a regulated profit margin and perhaps at
reduced efficiency. Nevertheless, the state pays enormous
amounts of money to shareholders to compensate for the
regulation of run-away profits. The LP could not afford this
kind of expense if it were elected.
Moreover, British law does not mandate compensation for
regulation and reduced profits. 7 In BP Petroleum Develop-
ments v. Ryder 28 the plaintiff wished to exploit the oil field
under his land. Although the government had nationalized the
oil industry, the plaintiff could apply for the right to exploit
the oil. The government denied the plaintiff's application and
the plaintiff sued for damages. Because the nationalized
petroleum had not been completely taken from private
individuals (they were still able to apply for licenses), the court
12 Wilson, supra note 116.
126 Nicholas Wood, Companies Likely to be Spared Burden of Petty
Officialdom, THE TIMES, June 21, 1991, at 7.
127 Other democratic countries similarly refuse to compensate for
regulatory action. Countries such as the United States do not require
compensation for regulation because compensation is not needed to restrict
the government's self-indulgence. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,
Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36
(1985) ("courts allow governments to regulate without paying compensation
for the harm that regulation inflicts on property owners. If the government
is not self-aggrandizing, so that regulations are formulated in light of the
public interest, the government can be trusted not to overregulate.").
12 BP Petroleum Developments Limited v. Ryder, [1987] R.& R. 211
(1987).
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permitted compensation. However, the court granted compen-
sation commensurate with the reduction in the land value, and
did not allow the plaintiff to recover lost profits. The court
found that "[a] consequence of these principles is that the
profitability of the land to the acquirer is irrelevant to the
assessment of compensation."12 The court further found
that "[iun contrast [to the land value approach] if the compen-
sation is to be measured by reference to the profitability to an
oil company of particular land, the quantum would vary in
every case."3 o
Therefore, the LP should not consider the compensation
issue upon stricter regulation of the privatized industries.
Although regulation cannot replace nationalization in all
instances, it represents a viable option for increased state
control. Regardless, Labour is not legally obligated to compen-
sate for regulation. Although Labour could manipulate the
compensation system for re-nationalization, regulation is
immediately viable. If the LP undertakes strict regulation,
subsequent re-nationalization will be less complicated.
10. CONCLUSION
The Thatcher government altered the course of British
economic development through privatization. Initially, these
changes appeared permanent. "The privatization and liberal-
ization programmes may turn out to be the most lasting
achievements of the Thatcher administration."' 3 ' Many
British citizens became shareholders, some for the first time.
Privatization appeared irreversible, but failure to improve
administration of the state water system and the inequity of
enormous profits for shareholders justify change.
The LP is firm in its commitment to re-nationalize some
industries. Re-nationalization would raise legal questions
regarding the liability to shareholders of these industries.
British legal precedent offers the LP a clean slate; the law
neither mandates a certain level of compensation nor provides
precedential guidance. The LP could manipulate the terms of
compensation and recapture the privatized industries without
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depleting the state's resources. Moreover, the LP can control
the industries through regulation without legal consequence.
Labour must exploit these legal opportunities if it wants to
fulfill its political agenda. Labour should initiate regulation
of the industries it has pledged to re-nationalize, including the
National Grid, hospital trusts, and water industry. Regulation
does not require compensation, and would help to deflate the
huge profits attributable to privatization. Labour, in turn,
would benefit politically because the apparent benefits of
privatization would be diminished. The LP would then be in
a better position to re-nationalize. Reduced profits will
depress share prices, thereby allowing the LP to capitalize by
offering reduced compensation, if any, significantly decreasing
the cost of compensation. This gradual process offers the most
realistic opportunity for re-nationalization, one that the
Labour must embrace to fulfill its commitment to re-national-
ization.
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